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Aero n yms COTS EEE PM R.M QA SFP SMA SR.M TR.L commercial oiT-the-shelf electrical, electronic, electromagnetic parts management risk management quality assurmce single failure point Safety and Mission Assurance safety, reliabi ity, maintainability technology readiness level Ever since the need for improved reliability in space systems was recognized, it has been difficult to establish an identity for mission assurance engineering. Attempts to delineate an independent set of tasks for mission assurance engineering in the 1970's and 1980's resulted in the development of applied $,tatistics for mission assurance and a large group of tasks for the project. Mission failures in a well-developed system come from necessary risks that remain in the system for the mission. RM is the key to mission assurance. The traditional tasks of . applied statistics, . reliability, . maintainability, . system safety, . quality assurance,
. logistics support,
. human factors, . software assurance,
. system effectiveness, for a project are still important and should still be performed.
In the past, mission assurance activities were weakly structured. Often they were decoupled from the project planning activity. When a project had a problem (eg, a spacecraft would not fit on the launch vehicle adapter ring), the mission assurance people were involved to help solve it. Often problems were caused by:
. poorly communicated overall mission needs, . a limited database available to the project, . tight funding, . a limited launch window.
These factors resulted in much risk that was not recognized until it happened. The rule-based management method used by NASA recognized risk as a consequence, and classified 4 types of payloads:
A high priority, minimum risk; B high priority, medium risk; C medium priority, medium-high risk; D high risk, minimum cost.
Guidelines for system SRM&QA project requirements for classes A -D payloads were also spelled out. An example is the treatment of SFP:
. class A: success-critical SFP were not permitted;
. class B: success-critical SFP were allowed without a . is approximate because its purpose is to identify activities, not to classify efforts precisely. Specific missioii-assurance activities are changing, and the amount of effort expended in these might not be proportional to the emphasis given them. A good PM program is always important. The decrease in the use of reliability methods does not mean that PM is unimportant; it only reflects that the importance of PM has been well established and that PM has become a standard design control task as part of a project. . a thorough understanding of the concept of risk, . the principles of RM, . the establishment of a disciplined RM process (see figure . RM responsibilities: resources, schedules, milestones;
. RM methodologies: processes and tools to be used for risk identification, risk analysis, assessment, and mitigation; . criteria for categorizing or ranking risks according to
. role of decision-making, formal reviews, and status re-
. documentation requirements for RM products & actions.
A new direction for mission assurance engineers should be to provide dynamic, synthesizing feedback to those responsible for design, m,znufacturing, and mission operations. The feedback should:
porting with respect to RM;
. identify & rank risk, . determine risk mechanisms, . explain RM techniques.
Mission assurance and the project should work together to achieve mission success.
THE {CHALLENGE O F
NASA's BRAVE NEW WORLD NASA and many other US Government agencies have been forced to face a new workplace environment. With the NASA budget shrinking, the nature of projects has changed: many are fast-track and have fixed prices, which means that they must be completed in a better-fastercheaper manner. The dollars once put into facilities are very limited; the spacecraft budgets are smaller so the development cycle time h a ; been reduced to save money. The NASA solution to these constraints is to emphasize proactive RM processes. The paradigm has to change from rulebased to knowledge-based decisions, and to new methods that will improve productivity. Figure 3 shows The resources are hardware allocated during development and, at the same time, risks are addressed and traded off. When the adequacy is demonstrated, the spacecraft is launched, and the flight performance is accomplished with a recognized risk. As for rule-based activities, there can be some failures but there will be more spacecraft launches to learn from. Thus, the risk has been used as a resource process. The goal is to optimize the overall risk posture by accepting risk in one area to benefit another. A strategy to recover from the occurrence of risk must also be considered:
. risk trades will be made (best incremental return), . shows the function, risk trade, possible risk consequence, and advantages for the class of parts to be used in a spacecraft. The risk trade that a project needs to make is the type of parts to use:
. The NASA SMA office has the core competencies to is supporting Its role is to interact in all phases of the project decision process (planning, design, development, and operations).
It provides projects with residual risk assessment during the project life cycle. Figure 6 [3] shows the 'mission failure modes that cause risk' and some of the 'methods used to manage them' so that mission success can be achieved. a reliability specialist in the development of an ion propulsion system for space applications. He is assigned to the Office of Safety, Environmental, and Mission Assurance, which has the responsibility of assuring that all aerospace systems accomplish their assigned missions. To this end, he is educating aerospace personnel in the physics-of-failure and is teaching a training course on design-for-reliability (available on the lnternet at the OSE&MA homepage).
Prior to joining NASA, Lalli was a group leader in the TRW Electrical Product Development Division and worked on fuse research at Picatinny Arsenal and Case Institute of Technology.
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